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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Justin Lee Pedersen appeals from the judgment of conviction entered
upon his conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. Pedersen
claims the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Several officers investigating a reported theft were at Pedersen's
residence, which he shared with several others, when Pedersen arrived on his
motorcycle.

(Tr., p.7, L.17 - p.9, L.21, p.41, L.3 - p.42, L.10.)

One of the

detectives, Paul Jagosh, made contact with Pedersen after one of the individuals
being interviewed identified Pedersen as the person who gave her the stolen
property.

(Tr., p.15, L.15 - p.16, L.12, p.42, Ls.6-20, p.44, Ls.7-17.)

After

obtaining information from Pedersen regarding his identity, Detective Jagosh told
Pedersen "not to move" and went to contact dispatch to find out if Pedersen had
any "wants [or] warrants." (Tr., p.44, L.7 - p.46, L.5.) While Detective Jagosh
was running Pedersen's information through dispatch he saw Pedersen start to
take his jacket off and again told him "not to move."

(Tr., p.46, Ls.8-15.)

Pedersen nevertheless proceeded to remove his jacket and handed it, along with
his gloves, a buck knife, cell phone, an iPod, and his wallet to Colleen who was
sitting nearby.

(Tr., p.14, Ls.20-25, p.16, L.15 - p.17, L.23, p.44, Ls.18-21.)

Pedersen then "proceeded to walk off with [a] cigarette" and sat next to another
individual. (Tr., p.18, Ls.2-9.)
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After Pedersen sat down, Detective Jagosh returned and placed Pedersen
under arrest on an outstanding warrant.

(Tr., p.18, L.21 - p.19, L.13.)

As

Detective Jagosh was searching Pedersen and after he placed Pedersen in
handcuffs, he directed another detective to retrieve Pedersen's jacket and other
items that he

gave to Colleen.

(Tr., p.51, Ls.11-20.)

Pedersen's jacket revealed methamphetamine.

A search of

Tr., p.30, L.2 - p.31, L.2,

p.67, Ls.10-21.)
The state charged Pedersen with felony possession of a controlled
substance - methamphetamine.

(R, pp.6-7, 33-34, 42-43.)

Pedersen filed a

motion to suppress, claiming the evidence was found during an illegal search.
(R, pp.53-54.) The court conducted an evidentiary hearing after which it denied
Pedersen's motion. (R., p.74.) Pedersen thereafter entered a conditional guilty
plea, reserving his right to challenge the court's decision denying his request for
suppression. (R, pp.86-89.) The court imposed a unified seven-year sentence
with two years fixed and Pedersen filed a notice of appeal timely from the entry of
judgment. (R, pp.91-93, 96-98.)
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ISSUE
Pedersen states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr.
suppress?

motion to

(Appellant's Brief, p.g.)

The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Pedersen failed to establish the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress the evidence discovered pursuant to a search incident to his
arrest on a warrant?
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ARGUMENT
Pedersen Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion To
Suppress Evidence Found As A Result Of The Search Incident To His Arrest

A.

Introduction
Pedersen contends the district court erred in denying his motion to

suppress, arguing the search was an improper search incident to arrest.
Specifically, Pedersen argues the search incident to arrest exception "is
inapplicable based on the facts of this case" because his "jacket was not within
the area of [his] 'immediate controL'" (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Application of the
correct legal standards to the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and
the district court's factual findings shows Pedersen has failed to meet his burden
of showing error in the district court's decision.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Faith,
141 Idaho 728,730,117 P.3d 142,144 (Ct. App. 2005).

C.

The District Court Correctly Concluded Suppression Was Not Required
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.

"A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain
special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement."

State v.

Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coolidge v.
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New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,454-55 (1971); State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474,
479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999).) A search incident to arrest is a wellestablished exception to the warrant requirement and, as such, does not violate
the Fourth Amendment.

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969);

Kerley, 134 Idaho at 874, 11 P.3d at 493. The scope of such a search includes
"the arrestee's person and the area with his immediate control - construing that
phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence." Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. The justifications for
a search incident to arrest include officer safety and prevention of the
concealment or destruction of evidence.

kL.;

also Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332,

338 (2009) (search incident to arrest exception "derives from interests in officer
safety and evidence preservation that are typically implicated in arrest
situations"). Only "[i]f there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the
area that law enforcement officers seek to search" are the "justifications for the
search-incident-to-arrest exception [ ] absent" such that the "rule does not apply."
Gant, 556 U.S. at 339.
The district court, relying on the foregoing principles and the Court of
Appeals' opinion in State v. Bowman, 134 Idaho 176, 997 P.2d 637 (Ct. App.
2000), found the search of Pedersen's coat was a valid search incident to arrest.
(See generally Tr., pp.75-82.) In Bowman, an officer stopped two men believing
one of them had an outstanding arrest warrant. 134 Idaho at 177, 997 P.2d at
638. The men agreed to talk to the officer and the individual whom the officer
believed to be the subject of the outstanding arrest warrant identified himself as
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Bowman.

!sL. at

177-178, 997 P.2d at 638-639. While the officer was running a

warrants check, a woman came out of an adjacent mobile home and approached
Bowman.

!sL. at 178, 997 P.2d at 639.

After the officer learned that Bowman had

a warrant for his arrest, "but prior to informing Bowman that he was under arrest,"
the officer "observed Bowman take of his leather jacket and give it to the
woman."

!sL.

The officer exited his vehicle, told Bowman he was under arrest

and advised the woman she was not allowed to take Bowman's jacket.

!sL.

The

woman handed the jacket to the officer who subsequently searched it and found
a pipe, marijuana and methamphetamine.

kL.

On appeal, the Court considered whether Bowman was entitled to
suppression of the evidence found in his coat. In deciding there was no Fourth
Amendment violation,

the Court of Appeals

discussed the justifications

underlying the search incident to arrest exception and held:
To allow a defendant to hand over an article of clothing just before
his arrest and thereby avoid the search of said item would seriously
undercut the purposes and policy behind the search incident to that
arrest - ensuring the safety of officers and bystanders through the
recovery of weapons within the defendant's area of immediate
control and preventing the loss or destruction of evidence of
criminal activity. Faced with the possibility that the jacket might
contain a weapon or evidence of a crime which could be lost or
destroyed, we conclude that [the officer] acted reasonably in
requesting the jacket in order to search it incident to Bowman's
arrest.
We hold that such search did not violate Bowman's
constitutional rights.
Bowman, 134 Idaho at 180, 997 P.2d at 641 (footnote omitted).
The district court reached the same conclusion in this case. Relevant to
the court's determination were the following factual findings:
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While Detective Jagosh was running the defendant for
warrants, the defendant handed his gloves, his iPod, his knife, his
wallet, and his cellphone to Colleen. Colleen was located on the
steps -- well, steps similarly next to the front of the house.
The defendant knew that he had an outstanding warrant.
Of some significance is the fact that, prior to the defendant
handing these items over to Colleen, Detective Jagosh had
instructed the defendant to remain seated where he was, and the
defendant specifically disregarded or disobeyed that instruction in
getting up and moving over to where Colleen was to hand off those
items.
And I'll also note, because it does go directly to [defense
counsel's] argument distinguishing Bowman, that the defendant
himself testified that it was chilly that evening in March. Colleen
was located ten to 15 feet away from the defendant. And, again,
Colleen is the individual to whom the defendant gave his property.
There was no one in between Colleen and the defendant. The
defendant was arrested for [an] outstanding warrant and placed in
handcuffs.
I'll also note, as a finding of fact, I certainly believe the
defendant when he testified that the male he referred to as Junior
was, quote, "bigger and kind of intimating [sic]," end quote.

I also want to note, because I think it's important, the factual
finding that the information that Detective Jagosh had was not
simply that there was a female in the house, but that there was a
female in the house who's not coming out. In other words, efforts
had been made to retrieve that female from the house, and she
was unresponsive to those efforts.
(Tr., p.77, L.2 - p.78, L.19.)
Addressing whether Pedersen's coat was within the scope of his
immediate control, the district court specifically noted the factors the Court of
Appeals in Bowman directed trial courts to consider on this issue. (Tr., p.79, l.23
- p.80, L.11.) Those factors are:
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(1) the distance between the arrestee and the place searched; (2)
whether the arrestee was handcuffed or otherwise restrained; (3)
whether police were positioned so as to block the arrestee from the
area searched; (4) the ease of access to the area itself; and (5) the
number of officers present as compared to the number of
companions of the arrestee.
Bowman, 134 Idaho at 179-180,997 P.2d at 640-641.
Applying the foregoing factors, the district court found:
The distance between the arrestee and the place searched. That
distance, as I said, was ten to 15 feet; second, whether the arrestee
is handcuffed and otherwise detained. He was handcuffed at the
time that the search took place; third, whether police were
positioned so as to block the arrestee from the area search. The
police were not positioned so as to stop or block the arrestee from
the area search; fourth, ease of access to the area itself.
I've looked at State's Exhibit Nos. 1 through 4. And it's clear
from looking at the photographs that the distance between where
Colleen was seated and the defendant was seated on those
railroad ties was quite short. It could have been covered in a
matter of steps. So on that fourth factor there was great ease of
access to the area itself.
And, finally, the number of officers versus the number of
companions of the arrestee. I think this is the factor that the parties
have argued the most. And I don't know that this -- on the facts of
this case, that there's a magic number that controls the outcome.
And, I think, frankly, I can go through the officers that were
there, versus the -- we have called them civilians that were there:
One, two, three, four, five, six, seven civilians; one, two, three, four,
five, six officers. So we are at about a one-to-one ratio.
But that's not really controlling in this case, from my
perspective, because this is not a controlled situation. This is a
moving parts situation. It's not a situation where everybody is in
one place. You have people that are in the backyard. You have a
person that is in the house, refusing to come out.
There was also testimony that a Garden City officer -- and I'll
make this as a factual finding -- pulled one of the civilians to the left
side of the home. So we have a number of locations that are
uncontrolled by these officers.
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And, frankly, even if there were eight officers to five civilians,
even if they had outnumbered them, I can't say, given [t]he moving
parts and, frankly, the volatility of the situation, that the officers
could be safe.
(Tr., p.80, L.2 - p.81, L.23.)
Based on the court's factual findings and the applicable legal standards,
the district court correctly concluded "there was a risk to the officers" and a
potential for the "concealment or destruction of the evidence" justifying a search
incident to arrest. (Tr., p.81, L.24 - p.82, L.3.) This conclusion is supported by
Bowman, supra, and Supreme Court precedent. Chimel, supra; Gant, 556 U.S.
at 343, 347 (recognizing the twin rationales of Chimel and noting "there may be
still other circumstances in which safety or evidentiary interests would justify a
search" beyond those specifically articulated in prior cases).
On appeal, Pedersen disagrees with the district court's conclusion
regarding the risk presented.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.10-17.)

Pedersen

emphasizes that he was handcuffed and had given his jacket to someone else;
however, these factors were properly evaluated by the district court in reaching
its conclusion, which conclusion is consistent with Bowman.

Pedersen's

unsurprising disagreement with the district court's assessment does not establish
an abuse of discretion.
Regarding Bowman, Pedersen claims it is "distinguishable." (Appellant's
Brief, p.17.)

By "distinguishable," Pedersen appears to mean the case is no

longer good law or has been narrowed as he later asserts "the Bowman Court
used five factors identified by an outdated legal treatise" and claims "Bowman
offers little guidance on the issue in the case at hand" because it was "decided
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prior to the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in [State v. LaMay, 140 Idaho 835,
103 P.3d 448 (2004)]" and, according to Pedersen, "this case is strikingly similar
to the facts of LaMay." (Appellant's Brief, p.19.) In reality, this case is "strikingly
similar" to the facts of Bowman; nevertheless, Pedersen's claim that LaMay
compels a conclusion that the court erred in denying Pedersen's suppression
motion fails.
In LaMay, officers made contact with several individuals in a hotel room
after determining that one of the room's occupants had outstanding arrest
warrants. 140 Idaho at 837, 103 P.3d at 450. "There were seven people in the
room," including LaMay, who "was laying on the bed with a woman watching
television."

kL

The officers "took everybody except for Joseph LaMay into the

hallway, a distance of approximately fifteen feet from where LaMay had been at
the initial encounter"; LaMay was "taken into the bathroom for questioning."

kL

During a protective sweep of the room, an officer "saw a backpack on the floor
about ten inches from where LaMay's hand had been hanging off the bed when
the officers entered the room."

kL

After LaMay was arrested, handcuffed, and

"seated in the hallway with the rest of the persons from the room," an officer
searched his backpack, "finding currency, cocaine, and LaMay's driver's license."

kL

The district court suppressed and the state appealed. LaMay, 140 Idaho at

837,103 P.3d at 450.
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court cited the Bowman factors as
relevant to the determination of "what is reasonably within an arrestee's area of
immediate controL"

LaMay, 140 Idaho at 838, 103 P.3d at 451.
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Thus,

Pedersen's complaint about the Court of Appeals' "outdated" reliance on those
same factors is disingenuous at best.

Applying the Bowman factors, the

Supreme Court in LaMay concluded:
The backpack was nearly fifteen feet away from LaMay and located
in a different room. It presented no immediate danger to the
officers or others surrounding the arrest. ... The backpack and its
contents were not in danger of being destroyed. LaMay was
restrained in handcuffs and guarded by an officer in the hallway.
There were no exigent circumstances in this case justifying the
search of the backpack without a warrant.
LaMay, 140 Idaho at 839, 103 P.3d at 452.
Once the Court examines the respective facts of Bowman and LaMay, it is
readily apparent why Pedersen is incorrect in his assertion that LaMay is the
more relevant of the two. Unlike LaMay, and like Bowman, Pedersen gave his
property to another, undoubtedly knowing he was about to be arrested, and that
person, who was not restrained, had the ability to facilitate Pedersen's access to
the coat to obtain a weapon (such as his knife) or destroy any evidence
contained therein. Viewed this way, there is no reasoned basis for distinguishing
between the officer's ability to search Pedersen's pockets had he been wearing
it, even if handcuffed, and the ability to search the coat under the circumstances
present here.
Just as the Court concluded in Bowman, this Court should conclude that
officers acted reasonably in this case by searching Pedersen's jacket. Pedersen
has failed to meet his burden of showing otherwise.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district
court entered upon Pedersen's conditional guilty plea to possession of
methamphetamine.
DATED this 30 th day of May, 2014.

JEssrdA M. LORELLO
Depui1 Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 30 th day of May, 2014, served a true and
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
SALLY J. COOLEY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

J~S9ICA M. LORELLO
Dr~ty
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Attorney General

